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Trask appealed the judgment of the Commission to the Supreme
Court of Maine, arguing that: (1) the Commission committed an error
of law by measuring flowage in terms of acreage; and (2) that a conflict
existed between the Dam Abandonment Act and the Maine statute
relating to the sale of water utility property requiring the Commission
to give precedence to the Abandonment Act.
The court addressed the first issue by stating that the purpose of
section 6109 was to "govern the sale or transfer by a consumer-owned
water utility of land or property owned by that water utility .... "
Under this statute, a municipality has the right of first refusal to
purchase any land that lies within its boundaries and is offered for sale
under the statute. The property that is subject to the statute is defined
as "any land or property owned by a water utility... [which] contains
greater than five contiguous acres."
The court defined flowage rights as "in the nature of an easement
appurtenant," which is an easement that is incapable of existing
separate from the land to which it is connected. Since easements were
included in statutory definitions of "sale" and "land," and since section
6109 required a minimum threshold in acres, the court found that the
Commission was correct to measure flowage in terms of acreage. The
court stated that the legislative history supported the Commission's
interpretation and that other jurisdictions also referred to flowage
rights in terms of acreage. It concluded that it was inconsistent to
ensure that a city had an opportunity to preserve interests in
shorefront property without a corresponding right in the dam
property. The public value of the shorefront property is eliminated
without the dam.
As to Trask's second argument, the court found that the Dam
Abandonment Act and section 6109 could be read in harmony with
each other and that the two statutes were not conflicting. The Dam
Abandonment Act stated that a dam owner should follow the
procedures set out in the Dam Act until locating a prospective buyer,
thus implementing section 6109.
Stephanie Pickens
MARYLAND
Bucktail, LLC v. County Council, 723 A.2d 440 (Md. 1999) (holding
that the County Council did not support its decision to deny a
developer a growth allocation with substantial evidence).
Bucktail, LLC, a company formed to acquire and to develop land,
intended to build homes on ninety-three acres of land located near
the town of St. Michaels, Maryland. Of the ninety-three acres, twenty
were zoned as rural residential. However, the remaining seventy-three
were located within the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection
Program's resource conservation area, restricting construction to one
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home per twenty acres in areas that contained naturally dominated
environments. The zoning allowed Bucktail to construct only three
homes.
To increase the number of homes it could build, Bucktail applied
for a growth allocation with the Talbot County Planning Commission.
If approved, the growth allocation would have changed the overlay
zoning from a resource conservation area to a limited development
area and would have changed the underlying zoning from rural
conservation to rural residential.
The new zoning would allow
Bucktail to build fourteen homes.
The Planning Commission compared Bucktail's application to
statutory critical area criteria, which minimizes damage to water quality
and to natural habitats. The Planning Commission approved and
recommended that the County Council approve Bucktail's application.
In conformance with statutory mandates, the County Council
introduced a bill and opened the application for public hearings.
After the public hearing, the Council voted four to one against the bill.
The Council found that Bucktail's growth allocation did not comply
with all the critical area criteria. The Council denied Bucktail's
application for the growth allocation.
Bucktail sued the Council for denying application. Neighboring
property owners intervened as defendants. The circuit court found
that substantial evidence supported the Council's decision. Bucktail
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals where it argued that
substantial evidence did not support the Council's denial of the
rezoning, suggesting that the Council acted as a quasi-judicial entity.
The Council summarized its act as legislative and immune from
challenge.
The court determined that the Council's ultimate decision denying
the rezoning remained legislative. However, it ruled that the process of
applying the standards to particular facts remained judicial.
The court held that the Council's judicial actions were not
supported by substantial evidence on the record, stating that the
agency needed to have stated reasons for its decision. Thus, the court
held that the Council did not advise Bucktail of the deficient facts and
circumstances within the application.
Madoline Wallace
MINNESOTA
Pelican Group of Lakes Improvement Dist. v. Minnesota Dep't of
Natural Resources, 589 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding
the Department of Natural Resources had no duty to hold a contested
permit hearing for activities occurring above the high water level of
Cormorant Lakes).
Pelican Group of Lakes Improvement District ("Pelican Group") is

